A webhook triggers a cloud function. That function passes data to a build runner, which in turn spins up resources. None of this has a human behind the wheel, yet all of it needs IAM.
Start by naming and tagging non-human identities. Set up owners, even if it’s just a Slack channel or team alias, and keep human and non-human accounts fully separate. Before you grant permissions, map out exactly which bots talk to which services, and the boundaries of data they touch. If you skip this, you’ll inevitably stack up overprivileged tokens you can’t trace when something feels off.
Automated accounts get targeted for token theft and easy lateral movement. Even reputable orchestration tools can spread supply chain risk if you don’t clearly scope what bots can touch. Default to distrusting every machine identity as if it belongs to someone you don’t know, using zero trust as your guide. For specifics on bot-driven attack surfaces, scan the breakdown of automation risks.
No prod service needs “full admin” rights. Set every automated identity and workload to “default deny.” Grant access only to what’s required, nothing left to chance.
Review all automations and prune permissions every month or sprint. Even trusted bots pick up stale roles, and that’s risk. For more on securing digital automation, see automation risks.
Picture an automation job with a service account that can log in like a real user. Now that account gets phished, and the attacker has a direct line into critical systems. Service accounts should never have interactive logins. Lock those down so they only do what the script or app requires.
Automate secrets management using services like HashiCorp Vault or your cloud’s KMS. Never keep secrets hardcoded in the repo or pipeline—rotate and expire credentials on a short time-to-live, with a plan to roll keys quickly if needed. Use technologies like mTLS, OIDC, or workload identity federation to swap out static, long-lived credentials. These offer stronger proof of identity and are easier to rotate without breaks.
Make it a habit to scan for secrets in your CI/CD processes. Block merges or deployments if a secret leaks into code. The goal: kill static credentials and prospect for leaks before they reach production. Still finding sprawl? Shift secrets management automation left and scrub repos routinely.
Picture pushing a new microservice: someone opens a PR, code reviewers approve, automation provisions permissions. You want this flow repeatable and safe, so access never lingers or sprawls. Embed access provisioning in infrastructure-as-code (IaC) templates. Changes to permissions should use pull requests, with each modification reviewed by a human and logged for audit.
Use a catalog of preapproved roles for common CI jobs and bots. That keeps custom permissions rare and easy to spot. Apply conditional access controls—like limiting credentials to certain environments, branches, or pipeline jobs.
As soon as a job, repo, or bot is retired, trigger automatic deprovisioning of its access. Autobots don’t need ghost keys or zombie service accounts lurking after their use. Enforce separation of duties: orchestration admins build the automation itself, but only pipeline authors can adjust step-level permissions. Looking for more patterns? See our automation risks guide.
A sudden spike in pipeline API calls from one service account is flagged. The trail leads back to a misconfigured orchestration job, tipping off the security team. They revoke its access before anything breaks, thanks to tight monitoring.
To proactively defend your systems, put these foundational practices in place:
Building an effective response process is key:
For more lessons on strengthening your approach, review common issues highlighted in RPA vulnerabilities. Continuous learning will help tighten your safety net.
Q: What is the difference between human and non-human identities in IAM?
A: Human identities are tied to people, think engineers or contractors, who log in with usernames. Non-human identities include bots, scripts, and service accounts that run tasks without direct user action. Always tag both types clearly so you know who—or what—accessed each system.
Q: How do I apply least privilege to short-lived automation jobs?
A: Create granular roles per job or pipeline. Use Just-in-Time (JIT) access methods so permissions are granted only for the job's runtime. Revoke or expire those permissions immediately once the job ends.
Q: Are static API keys ever acceptable for orchestration tools?
A: Only as a last resort. Instead, use ephemeral credentials like short-lived tokens via OIDC, or leverage workload identity federation. If you must use a static key, store it in a vault and rotate it often.
Q: How often should I rotate automation credentials and audit roles?
A: Rotate all automation secrets and tokens at least every 30 days, or more frequently if you can automate it. Schedule a role permission review every quarter. Regular audits prevent forgotten privileges that become attack vectors.
Tool tip: Get more advice in this guide on automation risks.
